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Using non-cooperative games in extensive form, $n$-person multistage multichoice coopera-
tive (MMC) games with the perfect information, the finite length, and the terminal payoff
function, were defined in [4] and [5]. In such games any player may proceed cooperative
activity during not the whole game party butjust on some set of stages which are continuous
by order. We recall the basic ideas of so called partial cooperation proposed in [4] and [5],
which are referred for the more details.
Let $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ be the set of players. Denote the game tree with the origin $x_{0}$ by
$K(x_{0})$ . Suppose that the structure of $K(X_{0})$ satisfies the following conditions:
1) each path has equal length and includes $(T+1)n+1$ nodes, where $T$ is a finite natural
number;
2) all players make $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}$ according with their index order;
3) when a player makes the decision on behavior, he has perfect information;
4) within one stage every player makes by one move.
The restrictions laid on $K(x_{0})$ enable to introduce the following game rules. Before the
game starts each player $i\in N$ must, independently from the other players, point out $t^{\acute{l}}$ in the
set $\{0,1, \ldots, T, \tau+1\}$ . Taking $t^{i}\in\{0, \ldots, T\}$ means that player $i$ is ready to cooperate with
anyone since the stage $t^{i}$ . However, if the player chooses $T+1$ , he is going to keep on a non-
cooperative behavior during the game. After each player $i\in N$ determined himself about
$t^{i}$ , the combination $(t^{1}, \ldots, t^{i}, \ldots, t^{n})$ of made choices is announced and becomes commonly
kno.wn-. Players are permitted to al.ter the declared options. The given preferences exactly
describe behavior of players in the game. Since the initial stage until the stage $t^{\vec{l}}$ player
$i\in N$ keeps on the individually rational behavior and doesn’t collaborate with any other
player. Nevertheless, on every stage $t=t^{\acute{l}},$ $\ldots,$ $T$ he has to participate in the coalition of all
pla.ye.rs who are ready to cooperate on the stage $t$ too. Within such behavior is used, the
coalition is considered as the set of the players that have whenever $\mathrm{c}.0$operated during the
game party, and presented by vector $s=$ ( $s_{1,\ldots,}$ s . $.S$ ), where components are defined
by $s_{i}=T+1-t^{i}$ . Suppose that in according with a combination $(t^{1}, \ldots, t^{i}, \ldots, t^{n})$ , a path
$\{x_{0}, \ldots, x\tau\}$ is realized. Then the sum of the termin.. $\mathrm{a}1$ payoffs over all players $i\in N$ with
$s_{i}>0$ is admitted as the payoff of the coalition $s$ .
Note that it is no matter which path is going to be played during the game, if $t^{i}\neq T+1$ ,
player $i$ will cooperate since the stage $t^{i}$ in any case. Such restriction seems too strong. In
this paper we try to weaken the above mentioned conditions. As we will show, it leads to a
quite different concept of partial cooperation.
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2 The model.
Let $\Gamma$ be a finite $n$-person non-cooperative game in extensive form with perfect information.
Denote the set of players by $N=\{1, \ldots, n\}$ . Let $K(x_{0})$ be the game tree with the origin $x_{0}$ .
According with the definition of a game in extensive form, on $K(x_{0})$ there exists a partition
$P_{0},$ $P_{1,\ldots,n’ n+1}PP$ of the set of game tree nodes, where $P_{0}=\emptyset$ is the set of chance points,
$P_{1},$
$\ldots,$
$P_{n}$ are the sets of decision points of players, and $P_{n+1}$ is the set of endpoints. The
payoffs of players are specified by terminal real-valued functions $h_{i}:P_{n+1}arrow R_{+}^{1},$ $i\in N$ .
Let us call a behavior such that a player can as cooperate as play individually, a partial
cooperative one. Transform $\Gamma$ assuming that players may cooperate each other within some
conditions. We denote the changed game $\Gamma$ by $G(x_{0})$ . Further, if no confusion can arise,
under game one means $G(x_{0})$ . In this section the partial cooperation rules are described.
Demand that before the game starts each player $i\in N$ must decide if he cooperates or
not. If the player doesn’t want to collaborate with anybody he plays whole game alone. In
case the player is going to cooperate, he has to choose a combination $K_{i}$ of non-intersecting
subtrees $\{K(x^{1}), \ldots , K(x^{q})\}$ , with their origins $x^{1},$ $\ldots,$ $x^{q}$ being in $P_{i}$ . The choices have to
be independent from the other game participators, but when every player made his options
all decisions are announced. The combination $K_{i},$ $i\in N$ , is considered as the cooperation
region of player $i$ , i.e., player $i$ pledges himself to proceed his cooperative behavior on
the decision points in $K_{i}\cap P_{i}$ . On the nodes in $P_{i}\backslash K_{i}$ , player $i$ must use his individual
behavior. It is important that players are prohibited to change their choices during the
game. We formalize the cooperative regions of players by means of functions
$f_{i}:P_{i}arrow\{0,1\}$ , $i\in N$ . (2.1)
Definition. $f_{i},$ $i\in N$ , is called a cooperative function of player $i$ , if for an arbitrary
taken path $\{x_{0}, \ldots, xx\overline{X}\}/,//,$$\ldots,$ , where $x’\in P_{i}$ and $\overline{x}$ is a terminal node, from $f_{i}(x’)=1$
it follows that $f_{i}(y)=1$ for each $y\in P_{i}\cap\{x^{\prime/}, \ldots,\overline{x}\}$ .
We shall say that player $i$ keeps cooperative behavior on a node $x\in P_{i}$ if and only if
$f_{i}(x)=1$ . To interpret the game process correctly, we should explain what we mean under
the cooperative and individual behaviors of players, when the given game rules are used.
At the same time it will be shown that a combination $f=$ $(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots , f_{n})$ of cooperative
functions defines a coalition structure on every node of the game tree $K(x_{0})$ .
The cooperative behavior. Suppose that $f$ has been defined and after several moves
the game party came to a decision point $x\in P_{i}$ of player $i$ . Assume that the chosen
cooperative function satisfies $f_{i}(x)=1$ , i.e., player $i$ cooperates on $x$ . Let’s determine the
coalition whose interests are supported by player $i$ . Consider the set
$S_{j}^{1}(X)=\{j\in N|f_{j}(y)=1, \forall y\in P_{j}\cap\{x_{0}, \ldots, x\}\}$ . (2.2)
$S_{f}^{1}(x)$ includes the players who has cooperated before player $i$ . According with the definition
of the cooperative function, players in $S_{f}^{1}(x)$ will continue to cooperate on every their decision
point on the rest part $K(x)$ of the game. Notice that player $i$ belongs to $S_{f}^{1}(x)$ .
There is another group of players with whom player $i$ should coordinate his decision on
$x$ , and it is composed of the players who hasn’t made move on the path $\{x_{0}, \ldots, x\}$ yet, but
will cooperate after player $i$ . Let such players be united into the set $S_{f}^{2}(x)$ .
Definition A subtree $K(x)$ rising at $x$ is the trustiness region $(\mathrm{T}\mathrm{R})$ of player $j\in.N$ if for
every $y\in P_{j}\cap K(x)$ , the cooperative function $f(y)=1$ .
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Hence,
$S_{f}^{2}(X)=$ {$j\in N\backslash S_{f}^{1}(x)|K(x)$ is TR of player $j$ }. (2.3)
Saying that player $i\in N$ proceeds the cooperative behavior on a node $x\in K(x_{0})$ , we mean
that on $x$ player $i$ acts in the interests of the coalition
$S_{f}(x)=s_{f}^{1}(X)\cup S_{f}2(X)$ . (2.4)
The rest players in $N\backslash s_{J(}X$ ) are considered as individual ones on $x$ . Since $S_{f(X)}$ is defined by
the cooperative function $f$ , the whole coalition structure $S_{j(X)},$ $\{j_{1}\},$ $\{j_{2}\},$ $\ldots$ , $\{j_{|N\backslash s}f(x)|\}$
is specified by $f$ as well.
The individual behavior. Now suppose that $f_{i}(x)=0$ . Let us determine the individual
behavior of players $j_{1},$ $j_{2},$ $\ldots,$ $j_{1\backslash f}Ng(x)|$ . Notice that, once players in $S_{f(X)}$ are organized in
a coalition, they can be replaced by the united player-coalition $S_{f(X)}$ . Thus, actually, there
stays just $|N\backslash S_{f}(X)|$ of the game participators on the decision point $x$ . Let $\Gamma(x)$ be a
subgame of $\Gamma$ starting at $x$ . Consider $\Gamma_{f(X)}$ which is $\Gamma(x)$ with the changed set of players
$N_{j}(x)=\{sf(X), j1, \ldots,jk, \ldots,j_{1}N\backslash Sj(x)|\}$ . (2.5)
Since the coalition structure consisting of $S_{f(X)},$ $\{j_{1}\},$ $\{j_{2}\},$ $\ldots$ , $\{j_{|N\backslash s}f(x)|\}$ is valid at least
one move, starting from $x$ we can say that the player making decision on $x$ acts the same
manner as in $\Gamma_{f(X)}$ . Let $\Psi_{i}^{j}(x),$ $i\in N_{j}(x)$ , be the sets of players’ strategies. Denote by
$\Psi^{f}(x)=\prod_{i\in N_{f}(x})\Psi^{f}i(X)$ , the set of all situations in $\Gamma_{f}(x)$ . The payoff functions
$b_{i}^{f}:\Psi^{f}(x)arrow R_{+}^{1}$ , $i\in N_{f}(x)$ , (2.6)
of the game $\Gamma_{j(X)}$ are defined by means of the payoff functions of the game $\Gamma$ , i.e., if a path
$\{x, \ldots,\overline{x}\},\overline{x}\in P_{n+1}$ , is corresponded to a situation $\psi^{j}(x)\in\Psi^{j}(x)$ , then
$b_{i}^{f}(\psi^{f}(X))=h_{i}(\overline{x})$ , $i\in N\backslash \{S_{j}(x)\}$ , (2.7)
and
$b_{S_{j}(x}^{j}() \psi j(X))=\sum_{fj\in s(\overline{x})}hj(\overline{x})$
. (2.8)
$\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{S}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\overline{\psi}^{j}(x)=(\overline{\psi}_{j_{1}}^{j}(x), \ldots , \overline{\psi}_{js_{j}}^{j}(N\backslash (x)X), \overline{\psi}Sf(x)(xf))$ to be the absolute Nash equilibrium
situation in $\Gamma_{f}(x)$ .
Saying that players $j_{1},$ $j_{2},$ $\ldots,$ $j_{|N\backslash }S_{f(}x$ ) $|$ are the individual ones on $x$ in $G(X_{0})$ , we mean
that on every own decision point $y\in K(x)\cap P_{j_{k}}$ on the subtree $K(x)$ , player $j_{k},$ $k=$
$1,$
$\ldots$ , $|N\backslash S_{f}(X)|$ , acts according with and restricted to avoid the absolute Nash equilibrium
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{0}\mathrm{n}\overline{\psi}^{f}(X)$ .
Example 1. Consider a partial cooperative game $G(x_{0})$ with the game tree illustrated
on Figure 1. The set $N$ is composed of three players: $N=\{1,2,3\}$ . The decision points
of player 1 are represented by circles, player $2’ \mathrm{s}$ by triangles and those of player 3 by
blocks, respectively. Players’ payoffs are written in the endpoints. Assume that before the
game there was chosen a combination $f=(f_{1}, f2, f3)$ of the following cooperative functions:
$f_{1}(X_{0})=0,$ $f_{1}(x_{2}2)=0,$ $f_{2}(X_{11})=1,$ $f_{2}(x_{23})=0,$ $f_{3}(x_{21})=1,$ $f_{3}(X_{12})=0$ .
Let us find the coalition structure on the node $x_{11}\in P_{2}$ . Once player 1 doesn’t cooperate
on $x_{0},$ $S_{f}^{1}(x_{11})$ includes only player 2. Since $f_{3}(x_{21})=1$ and $f_{1}(x_{22})=0$ , the subtree $K(x_{11})$
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Figure 1: The game tree.
is the trustiness region of players 3 and 2 yet. Thus, $S_{f}(x_{11})=\{3\}$ . Hence, $S_{f}(X_{11})=\{2,3\}$
and the coalition structure on $x_{11}$ is {2, 3}, {1}.
Remark 1. It is not excluded that a player plays individually even though he is on the
region of his cooperative behavior.
For instance, take the combination $f$ of the cooperative functions used in Example 1
and substitute the choice of player 1 as follows: $f_{1}(x_{0})=1,$ $f_{1}(X_{22})=1$ . Consider the set
$S_{f}(x_{0})$ . Players 2 and 3 are ready to cooperate on every their personal nodes on the subtree
$K(x_{11})$ . Since $f_{2}(x_{23})=f_{3}(X_{12})=0$ , the tree $K(X_{0})$ is not the trustiness region for players
2 and 3. Therefore, we obtain $S_{f}(x\mathrm{o})=\{1\}$ . According with the made interpretation of
the cooperative behavior, player 1 chooses on $x_{0}$ such alternative, for $S_{f}(x\mathrm{o})$ to get maximal
payoff. However, $S_{f}(x_{0})$ is only player 1. Thus, we can say that, he acts on $x_{0}$ as an
individual player.
Remark 2. For arbitrary taken decision point $x$ and its immediate predecessor $y$ , let
coalition $S_{f}(y)$ be not empty. Then, $S_{f}(x)$ is also not empty and, moreover, we have
$S_{j}(y)\subset S_{f}(x)$ .
3 The algorithm of the path construction.
In this section we investigate whether a combination $f$ of the cooperative functions $f_{i},$ $i\in N$ ,
defines a trajectory of the game development. Such relation between $f$ and a game path
enables to estimate each $f_{i},$ $i\in N$ .
Let $F_{i}$ be the set of all cooperative functions of player $i\in N$ . Denote the set of all
compositions of players’ cooperative functions by $F=\{f=(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n})|f_{i}\in F_{i}, i\in N\}$ . As
shown before, if $f\in F$ is given, then a coalition structure on every node of the game tree
can be obtained. Since it is known whose interests are prevailed on a considered decision
point, we are able to find the corresponding path for all $f\in F$ .
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The path is determined by means of backward construction, moving from the final nodes
toward the initial one. Our procedure is similar to those used in the scheme of the Nash
equilibrium construction. The difference between the methods is stated in the following. Let
$K(x)$ belong to a cooperation region of player $i$ . Then, on the endpoints of $K(x)$ instead of
the payoff of player $i$ we have the payoff of a coalition which includes player $i$ . By the Nash
scheme the decisions of player $i$ maximizing the coalition payoff can be easily determined
with respect to $K(x)$ . However, since the player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ payoff is not picked out from the coalition
payoff, there occur difficulties on the decision points of player $i$ between $x$ and the root $x_{0}$ ,
where player $i$ plays individually. If the share of player $i$ in the coalition payoff is known,
then applying the Nash scheme again, we can find the strategy of player $i$ on his personal
nodes of the path $\{x_{0}, \ldots, x\}$ . Therefore, the definition of players’ payoffs corresponding to
nodes where the individual behavior is replaced $.\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}$ the cooperative one is the main problem
considered in the algorithm.
During the explanation we will often use the following notations. Assume that $x$ is an
arbitrary node. Let the set of immediate successors of $x$ be $Z(x)$ . Denote the decision
maker on $x$ by $i(x)\in N$ . We say that the decision of player $i(x)$ on $x$ leads out at the node
$\overline{x}\in Z(x)$ . Finally, we propose that a combination $f=(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n})$ of cooperative functions
determines players’ preferences by the rule $c_{f}$ : if $x$ is a decision point of player $i$ , then
$c_{f}(x)=\{$
1, if $f_{i}(x)=1$ (3.1)
$0$ , if $f_{i}(X)=0$ .
Now suppose that one of the longest path of the game tree goes through $T$ decision points.
Introduce a partition of all nodes on $T+1$ sets $X_{0},$ $X_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $X_{t},$ $\ldots,$ $X_{\tau}=\{x_{0}\}$ , where $X_{t}$
is composed of nodes which are reachable from $x_{0}$ after $T-t$ sequential moves. Denote
decision points belonging to $X_{t}$ by $x_{t},$ $t=1,$ $\ldots,$ $T$ .
Running ahead, we remark that the payoffs considered by players on their decision points
may not coincide with the terminal payoff functions $h_{i},$ $i\in N$ . To trace the alteration of the
payoff system, we will write out the terminal payoffs which are taken in account by players
on nodes $X_{t},$ $t=1,$ $\ldots,$ $T$ , by means of functions $r_{i}^{t},$ $i\in N$ .
Assume that players $i\in N$ have arranged to proceed their behaviors according with
$f\in F$ . Let us find the path of the game related to the taken $f$ .
The initial stage. Consider the set $P_{n+1}$ of endpoints. Since no player makes move on
$P_{n+1}$ , the coalition structure on $x\in P_{n+1}$ and that on its immediate predecessor $x_{1},$ $Z(x1)\ni$
$x$ , are the same. On the node $x_{1}$ the given $f$ specifies coalitions $S_{f}(x_{1}),$ $\{j_{1}\},$ $\ldots$ , $\{j_{|N\backslash f}S(x1)|\}$ .
We compound the terminal payoffs $h_{1}(x),$ $\ldots$ , $h_{n}(x)$ on $x$ in such way the new payment




and an individual player $j_{k},$ $k=1,$ $\ldots,$ $|N\backslash S_{f}(X_{1})|$ , obtains $h_{j_{k}}(x)$ on the node $x$ .
Stage 1. Shift down from the endpoints $Z(x_{1}),$ $X_{1}\in X_{1}$ , to their predecessors. Consider
an arbitrary taken $x_{1}$ . If $c_{f}(x_{1})=1$ , player $i(x_{1})$ cooperates on $x_{1}$ , from which it follows
that $i(x_{1})$ maximizes the payoff of the coalition $S_{f}(x_{1})$ . Hence, the endpoint $\overline{x}_{1}\in Z(x_{1})$ has
to satisfy
$\max_{x\in Z(x1)is_{f(}}\sum_{\in x1)}h_{i}(x_{1})(x)=i\in Sf\sum h_{i}(x1)((x1)\overline{x}_{1}).$
. . (3.3)
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In case $c_{f}(x_{1})=0$ , player $i(x_{1})$ pursuits his own benefit and the node $\overline{x}_{1}$ is determined by
$\max_{x\in Z(x1)}h_{i(x_{1})}(X)=h_{(x_{1}}i)(\overline{x}_{1})$ . (3.4)
In the same way, we can construct trajectories rising at the rest nodes in $X_{1}$ . Thus, on each
subtree $K(x_{1}),$ $x_{1}\in X_{1}$ , there is stayed just one by one endpoint $\overline{x}_{1}$ that is suspected to be
the final node of the constructed path of the game. Therefore, instead of considering the
terminal payoff function $h_{i},$ $i\in N$ , on $P_{n+1}$ , we may deal with payoff functions $r_{i}^{1}$ : $X_{1}arrow R_{+}^{1}$ ,
$i\in N$ , on $X_{1}$ such that
$r_{i}^{1}(x_{1})=\{$
$h_{i}(\overline{x}_{1})$ , if $x_{1}\not\in P_{n+1}$ ;
$h_{i}(x_{1})$ , if $x_{1}\in P_{n+1}$ . (3.5)
Stage 2. Continue moving toward the tree root. Find the players’ decisions on the nodes
in $X_{2}$ . As far as we specified functions $r_{i}^{1},$ $i\in N$ , it seems that player $i(x_{2}),$ $x_{2}\in X_{2}$ knows
an obtained payoff for each his decision on $x_{2}$ . Nevertheless, it may occur that for some set
$Y(x_{2})$ of nodes in $Z(x_{2})$ either the payoff of the player $i(x_{2})$ when $c_{f}(x_{2})=0$ or the payoff
of the coalition $S_{f}(x_{2})$ when $c_{f}(x_{2})=1$ is not determined. For example, assume that player
$i(x_{2})$ makes move on $K(x_{2})$ twice, i.e., there exists a node $y_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$ such that $i(y_{1})$ and
$i(x_{2})$ are the same player. Let $c_{j}(x_{2})=0$ and $c_{j}(y_{1})=1$ . Then, whereas player $i(x_{2})$ belongs
to a coalition $S_{f}(y_{1})$ on the whole subtree $K(y_{1})$ he plays individually on the decision point
$x_{2}$ . Since the payoff of player $i(x_{2})$ is not identified in the payoff $\sum_{i\in S_{f}(}y_{1}$ ) $r_{i}^{1}(\overline{y}_{1})$ of the
coalition $S_{f}(y_{1})$ , his payoff $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{n}’ \mathrm{t}$ known on $y_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$ .
Generally speaking, the lack of information occurs when coalition structure is changed,.
and this alteration affects the current decision maker, i.e., there exists a node $y_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$
such that individually playing player $i(x_{2})$ enters into multi-player coalition $S_{f}(y_{1})$ on $y_{1}$ ,
or coalition $S_{f}(x_{2})$ which includes the decision maker $i(x_{2})$ increases on $y_{1}$ . For each node
$x_{2}\in X_{2}$ we deal with two main cases.
1) Let $Y(x_{2})=\emptyset$ . First, assume that $c_{f}(x_{2})=0$ . It means that the player $i(x_{2})$ doesn’t
cooperate on $x_{2}$ and maximizes his own payoff. Then, the path on the subtree $K(x_{2})$ has
to go through a node $\overline{x}_{2}$ specified by
$\max_{x\in Z(x_{2}1}r_{i(}^{1})(x_{2}X)=r^{1}(x_{2})(i\overline{x}_{2})$ . (3.6)
Now assume that $c_{f}(x_{2})=1$ . By the definition of the cooperative function, the coalition
$S_{f}(x_{2})$ may include players no grater than coalition $S_{f}(x_{1})$ for each $x_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$ . Therefore,
since $Y(x_{2})=\emptyset$ , the coalitions $S_{f}(x_{2})$ and $S_{j}(X_{1})$ coincide. Thus, player $i(x_{2})$ chooses on
$x_{2}$ a branch leading to such $\overline{x}_{2}$ that
$x \in Z(x2)_{is_{f}(x_{2})}\max\in\sum r_{i}1(X)=\sum_{(i\in Sfx_{2})}r(_{\overline{X}_{2})}i1$
. (3.7)
2) Now suppose that $Y(x_{2})\neq\emptyset$ . As we discussed above, when $c_{f}(X2)=0$ we don’t know
the payoff of the player $i(x_{2})$ on $Y(x_{2})$ . On the other hand, in the case of $c_{j(x_{2})}=1$ , we
have $S_{j}(x_{1})\backslash S_{f}(x2)\neq\emptyset$ . Once $S_{f}(X_{2})\subset S_{f}(X_{1})$ , on $Y(x_{2})$ the payoff of the coalition $S_{f}(X_{2})$
is included into the payoff of the coalition $S_{f}(X_{1})$ and thus, not defined too.
To construct path on $K(x_{2})$ , it is necessary for an imputation of payoff of coalition $S_{f}(y_{1})$
to be determined for each $y_{1}\in Y(x_{2})$ . We do it by considering a cooperative positional game
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$G_{f}(y_{1}, s_{f}(y_{1}))$ on the subtree $K(y_{1})$ with the set of players $s_{f(y_{1})}$ and the characteristic
function $v_{f}(y_{1}, S),$ $S\subset S_{f}(y_{1})$ , for each $y_{1}\in Y(x_{2})$ . The explanation of the cooperative
function construction will be provided later. Now, we just admit that the characteristic
function can be constructed. For the sake of determination let us use the Shapley value
$Sh^{f}(y_{1})=(Sh_{k_{1}}^{f}(y_{1}), \ldots , Sh_{k_{\mathrm{I}^{s_{y}|}}}^{f}1(y_{1}))$ (3.8)
as an optimal imputation of the payoff of the coalition $S_{f}(y_{1})$ . We shall say that if the
choice of player $i(x_{2})$ on $x_{2}$ is a branch leading to $y_{1}\in Y(x_{2})$ , then after the game reaches
the endpoint $\overline{y}_{1}$ , the payoff of player $i(x_{2})$ is to be determined by the Shapley value $Sh^{f}(y_{1})$
and equal to $Sh_{i(x)}!(2y_{1})$ . Then, we have to correct the payoff functions $r_{i}^{1},$ $i\in N$ . Let us
describe the new payment system by means of functions $\overline{r}_{i}^{1}$ : $X_{1}arrow R_{+}^{1},$ $i\in N$ , where for
$x_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$
$\overline{r}_{i}^{1}(x_{1})=\{$
$Sh_{i}^{\overline{J}}(X1)$ , if $x_{1}\in Y(x_{2})$ and $i\in S_{f}(x_{1})$ ;
$r_{i}^{1}(x_{1})$ , otherwise.
(3.9)
Suppose that $c_{f}(X2)=0$ . Then for player $i(x_{2})$ it is optimal to realize a path which goes
through the decision point $\overline{x}_{2}\in Z(x_{2})$ satisfying
$x \in Z(x2)\max\overline{r}_{(}^{1})(ix_{2}X)=\overline{r}_{(x_{2}}^{1})(i2)\overline{x}$ . (3.10)
Now let $c_{f}(x_{2})=1$ . Since player $i(x_{2})$ cooperates on $x_{2}$ with coalition $s_{j}(X_{2})$ , he maxi-
mizes the coalition payoff and chooses $\overline{x}_{2}$ by
$\max_{x\in Z(x_{2})i\in}\sum_{2S_{f}(x)}\overline{r}^{1})(xi(x2)=\sum_{i\in S_{f}(x_{2})}\overline{\Gamma}_{i}^{1}(x_{2})(\overline{x}2)$
. (3.11)
In the remainder of the second stage explanation, we remark that since for each $x_{2}\in X_{2}$
the decision of player $i(x_{2})$ on $x_{2}$ and the decision of each player $i(x_{1})$ on $x_{1}\in Z(x_{2})$ are
determined, the path which is realized on the subtree $K(x_{2})$ when the game reaches $x_{2}$ is
found. Hence, to construct the path on a subtree $K(x_{3}),$ $x_{3}\in X_{3}$ , we have to consider
just the decisions of players $i(x_{3}),$ $x_{3}\in X_{3}$ . When $Y(x_{2})\neq\emptyset$ , the payoffs of players are
different from those in the case of $Y(x_{2})=\emptyset$ . Let us define the payoffs on $X_{2}$ by functions
$r_{i}^{2}:X_{2}arrow R_{+}^{1},$ $i\in N$ , such that for $x_{2}\in X_{2}$ and $i\in N$
$r_{i}^{2}(X_{2})=\{$
$r_{i}^{1}(\overline{x}_{2})$ , if $Y(x_{2})=\emptyset$ ;
$\overline{r}_{i}^{1}(\overline{x}_{2})$ , if $Y(x_{2})\neq\emptyset$ ;
$h_{i}(x_{2})$ , if $x_{2}\in P_{n+1}$ .
(3.12)
Since the procedures on the further stages are the same, omitting explanation of every
stage we deal with a stage $t$ as an example of the general approach. So, suppose that we
have reached a set of nodes $X_{t}$ by continuing the moving on the game tree toward the origin
$x_{0}$ . Let $r^{t-1}i$ : $xt-1arrow R_{+}^{1}$ , $i\in N$ , be payoff functions obtained on the stage $t-1$ for $X_{t-1}$ .
Stage $t$ . We don’t deal with the endpoints belonging to $X_{t}\cap P_{n+1}$ , because they have
been considered on the initial stage yet. Let us find the decisions of players on the set
of non-terminal nodes $X_{t}\backslash P_{n+1}$ . First, we discuss the case when determination of a new
payment structure is not needed.
1) Assume that $Y(x_{t})=\emptyset$ for all $x_{t}\in X_{t}\backslash P_{n+1}$ . In this case, the functions $r_{i}^{t-1},$ $i\in N$ ,
specify the payoff obtained at the end of the game for each player $i(x_{t}),$ $x_{t}\in X_{t}\backslash P_{n+1}$ ,
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i.e., if the decision of player $i(x_{t})$ leads out at a node $\overline{x}_{t}\in Z(x_{t})$ , then at the end of the
game the coalition $S_{f}(x_{t})$ will get $\sum_{i\in s_{j(}}xt$ ) $r^{t1}i^{-}(\overline{x}_{t})$ , and the payoffs of individual players
$j_{k},$ $k=1,$ $\ldots,$ $|s_{f}(Xt)|$ , to be $r_{j}^{t-1}(k\overline{X}t)$ , respectively. Therefore, we can easily determine the
nodes $\overline{x}_{t}$ , where $\overline{x}_{t}\in Z(x_{t})$ and $x_{t}\in X_{t}\backslash P_{n+1}$ .
If $c_{f}(x_{t})=0$ , then $\overline{x}_{t}$ has to satisfy
$\max_{x\in Z(x_{t})}r_{(\mathrm{g}}(ix)x)l-\mathrm{l}=r_{i()}^{\iota-1}x_{t}(\overline{x}_{\mathrm{f}})$. (3.13)
If $c_{j}(x_{t})=1$ , then since player $i(x_{t})$ belongs to the coalition $S_{f}(x_{t})$ on $x_{t}$ , the node $\overline{x}_{t}$ is
searched by
$\max_{x\in Z(x_{t})_{i}}\sum_{j\in S(x_{t})}r_{(}-1(ixt)xt)=\sum_{xi\in s_{f()}t}r_{i}^{t}-1((x_{t})\overline{X}t)$
. (3.14)
2) Now suppose that there exists $x_{t}$ such that the subset $Y(x_{t})\subset Z(x_{t})$ of nodes where
the payoff of the coalition including player $i(x_{t})$ is not defined by the functions $r_{i}^{t-1},$ $i\in N$ ,
is not empty. Notice that since we use the terminal payoff functions, with respect to the
final gains it is not important in what coalitions a player has been participated during
the game. He obtains the payoff just in accordance with the coalition structures at the
endpoints. Therefore, if for each successor $x_{t-1}\in Z(x_{t})$ of a node $x_{t}$ the share of player
$i(x_{t})$ in the payoff of the coalition $S_{f(X)}$ , where $x$ is the final point of the path rising at $x_{t-1}$ ,
has been defined yet, we don’t need to determine the share of player $i(x_{t})$ in the payoffs
$\Sigma_{i\in S_{f}(x}t)r^{t1}i^{-}(xt-1)$ of the coalition $S_{f}(x_{\iota})$ on $x_{t-1}\in Z(X_{t})$ .
To know the decision of player $i(x_{t})$ on $x_{t}$ , for $y_{t-1}\in Y(x_{t})$ we consider a coopera-
tive positional $|S_{!}(yt-1)|$-person games $G_{f}(y_{t-}1, S_{f}(yt-1))$ with the characteristic functions
$v_{f}(y_{\iota-1}, S),$ $S\subset S_{f}(y_{t1}-)$ . The Shapley value
$Sh^{f}(y_{\iota_{-1}})=(Sh_{k_{1}}^{j}(y_{\mathrm{f}-1}), \ldots, Shk_{\{s|}jvt-1(y_{t-1}))$ , (3.15)
is taken as an optimal imputation of payoff of coalition $S_{f}(y_{t}-1)$ . Hence, the changed payoffs
on $X_{t-1}$ are specified by functions $\overline{r}_{i}^{t-1}$ : $x_{t1}-arrow R_{+}^{1},$ $i\in N$ such that for $x_{t-1}\in Z(x_{t})$
$\overline{r}_{i}^{t-1}(xt-1)=\{$
$Sh_{i}^{f}(x_{t-1})$ , if $x_{t-1}\in Y(x_{t})$ and $i\in S_{f}(X_{t-1})$ ;
$r_{i}^{t-1}(X_{t-1})$ , otherwise. (3.16)
Suppose that $c_{f}(x_{t})=0$ . Then player $i(x_{t})$ chooses on $x_{t}$ a branch leading out to such
node $\overline{x}_{t}\in Z(x_{t})$ that
$x\in Z(xt\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x})\overline{r}_{i(x_{c})}^{l}(x)=\overline{r}_{i(x_{t})}^{t}(\overline{x}_{t})$ . (3.17)
If $c_{f}(x_{t})=1$ , then player $i(x_{t})$ cooperates on $x_{t}$ with the coalition $S_{f}(x_{t})$ . Hence, $\overline{x}_{t}$ has to
satisfy
$x \in\max_{z(x_{\ell})i}\sum_{x_{\mathrm{t}}\in S_{f}()}\overline{r}_{(x)}(i\iota)tx=i\in s_{f(}\sum_{tx)}\overline{r}_{i}t(x_{t})(\overline{x}_{\mathrm{f}})$
. (3.18)
Finally, since the decisions of players have been determined for every node $x_{t}\in X_{t}$ , we
know the game development on any subtree $K(x_{t}),$ $x_{t}\in X_{t}$ . Besides, during the stage $t$ we
created the functions $r_{i}^{t}:X_{t}arrow R_{+}^{1}$ which show the payoffs obtained by players on $x_{t}\in X_{t}$ ,
if the game reaches $x_{t}$ . The function $r_{i}^{t}$ is defined as follows:
$r_{i}^{t}(x_{t})=\{$
$r_{i}^{t-1}(\overline{x}t)$ , if $Y(x_{t})=\emptyset$ ;
$\overline{r}_{i}^{t-1}(\overline{x}_{t})$ , if $Y(x_{t})\neq\emptyset$ ;
$h_{i}(x_{t})$ , if $x_{t}\in P_{n+1}$ ,
(3.19)
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where $x_{t}\in X_{t}$ .
Continue the moving on $K(x_{0})$ toward the origin $x_{0}$ . By sequentially determining players’
decisions on the rest sets $X_{\tau},$ $\tau=t+1,$ $\ldots,$ $T$ , we can construct a path which is realized if
players are ruled by the given combination $f=$ $(f_{1}, \ldots , f_{n})$ of the cooperative functions $f_{i}$ ,
$i\in N$ . We denote the path related to $f$ by $x(f)$ .
Cooperative subgames. Now we discuss the construction of cooperative subgames
$G_{f}(y_{\mathrm{f}1}-, sf(y_{t-}1)),$ $y_{t-1}\in Y(x_{t})$ . With respect to $G_{f}(y_{t-1}, Sf(yt-1))$ we have that, though
the game tree has the information structure for $n$ participators, the set of players con-
tains less than $n$ players. We demonstrate that the definition of the individual behavior
made in Section 2 allows to create the characteristic function $v_{f}(yt-1, S),$ $S\subset S_{f}(yt-1)$ , of
$G_{f}(y_{t-1,f}S(y_{t1}-))$ .
Consider the subgame $\Gamma(x\mathrm{f})$ of the game $\Gamma$ . Change the set of players of $\Gamma(x_{t})$ in accor-
dance with the coalition structure on $x_{t}$ . Let the new set be
$N_{f}(x_{t})=\{S_{f}(X_{t}), j1, \ldots,j_{N}\backslash Sf(xt)\}$ . (3.20)
Denote the subgame $\Gamma(x_{t})$ with the set of players $N_{f}(x_{t})$ by $\Gamma_{f}(x_{t})$ ; see Section 2. Return
to the partial cooperation. By our interpretation of the individual behavior, on every node
$x\in P_{j_{k}}\mathrm{n}K(xt)$ player $j_{k},$ $k=1,$ $\ldots,$ $|N\backslash S_{f}(X_{8})|$ , uses the absolute Nash equilibrium strategy
$\overline{\psi}_{j_{k}}^{f}(x_{t})$ and is prohibited to avoid it. Notice that such behavior is reasonable and convenient
for a non-cooperating player and it doesn’t seem as a clear restriction. Since the decisions




be the set of strategies of a coalition $S\subseteq S_{f}(x_{t})$ . Then, the following characteristic function
$v_{f}(x_{t}, s)$ is superadditive:
$v_{f}(x_{t}, S)=$
$\max_{f,\psi s(x_{t})\psi_{s_{f^{()\backslash }}}^{f}}\min_{xtS}\sum_{t}(x)_{i\in s}bif(\overline{\psi}_{j}^{f}1(X_{t}), \ldots, \overline{\psi}j_{|S}ff^{(x)1}t(x_{t}), \psi sf(x_{t}), \psi S_{f}f(x_{t})\backslash S(x_{t}))$
, (3.22)
where $S\subset S_{f}(x_{t}),$ $\psi_{s}^{f}(x_{t})\in\Psi_{s}^{f}(x_{t}),$ $\psi_{S_{f}}f((xt)\backslash Sx_{t})\in\Psi_{S_{f()}}^{f}xt\backslash s(X_{t})$
In the reminder of this section we make an illustration of the path construction.
Example 2. We continue Example 1. Let us find path $x(f)$ for a combination $f$ of
cooperative functions such that $f_{1}(X_{0})=1,$ $f_{1}(X_{22})=1,$ $f_{2}(X_{11})=1,$ $f_{2}(x_{23})=0,$ $f_{3}(X_{2}1)=$
$0,$ $f_{3}(X_{12})=1$ . In this case, we have $S_{f}(X_{21})=S_{f}(x_{11})=S_{f}(x_{22})=\{1,2\},$ $S_{f}(x23)=$
$S_{f}(x_{12})=\{1,3\},$ $S_{f}(x\mathrm{o})=\{1\}$ . Thus, on $x_{21}$ , player 3 doesn’t cooperate and chooses the
left branch to obtain 2. On $x_{22}$ , player 1 maximizes the payoff of the coalition {1, 2} and
select the left branch leading at $x_{33}$ . On $x_{23}$ , player 2 goes left to get 2. On $x_{11}$ , player 2
is in the coalition with player 1, and hence, he chooses the right branch. On $x_{12}$ , player 3
cooperates with player 1. Therefore, he plays left for coalition {1, 3} to obtain 6. Since
player 1 cooperates on $x_{0}$ and both $S_{f}(X_{11})\backslash S_{f}(X0)$ and $S_{f}(x_{12})\backslash S_{f}(X\mathrm{o})$ are not empty, we
must calculate the share of player 1 in the payoff of the coalition {1, 2} on $K(x_{11})$ and in that
of the coalition {1, 3} on $K(x_{12})$ , respectively. For these reasons we construct the cooperative
subgames $G_{f}(x_{11}, \{1,2\})$ and $G_{f}(x_{12}, \{1,3\})$ . The values of the characteristic function of
$G(x_{11}, \{1,2\})$ as follows, $v_{j}(X_{1}1, \{1\})=1,$ $v_{f}(x_{11}, \{2\})=1,$ $v_{f}(x_{11}, \{1,2\})=4$ . Thus, the
Shapley value of $G(x_{11}, \{1,2\})$ equals to $(2, 2)$ . Hence, for the node $x_{11}$ , the vector-payoff
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(2, 2, 2) is corresponded. Consider the values of characteristic function of $G_{j}(x_{12}, \{1,3\})$ .
We have $v_{f}(x_{12}, \{1\})=1\frac{1}{4},$ $v_{f}(x_{12}, \{3\})=3,$ $v_{j}(X_{12}, \{1,3\})=6$ . The Shapley value in
$G_{f}(x_{12}, \{1,3\})$ is $(2 \frac{1}{8},3\frac{7}{8})$ . Then the vector-payoff $(2 \frac{1}{8},2,3\frac{7}{8})$ is defined on $x_{12}$ . Because
player 1 maximizes only his own payoff, he chooses the right branch to obtain $2 \frac{1}{8}$ . Thus, we
can conclude that the path $x_{f}=\{x_{0}, x12, X23, x_{35}\}$ is related to the given combination $f$ of
the cooperative functions.
4 The payoff function.
In [4] and [5], the payoff function defines only the payoff of coalition of players who had
ever cooperated in a game party, without consideration for the payoffs of non-cooperating
players. Such interpretation of the payoff function is suitable to consider the relation between
cooperative activity of a player and the payoff of the coalition including him. In this paper
we try to investigate the influence of the cooperative activity of each player on the payoff of
the grant coalition $N$ .
Definition. The function $H:Farrow R_{+}^{1}$ , where
$H(f)= \sum_{i\in N}hi(_{X_{f})}$ , (4.1)
is called the payoff function of the partial cooperative game $G(X_{0})$ .
We treat the solution of $G(x_{0})$ as a payment system which stimulates players to act in
the common interests and is acceptable by every player. Let us order each $F_{i},$ $i\in N$ as
follows. In the sequence $f_{i}^{0},$ $f_{i}^{1},$ $\ldots f^{|F_{t}|}i-1,$ $fi|F_{i}|$ , the function $f_{i}^{0}$ should be related to the
lowest cooperative activity of player $i$ and $f_{i}^{|F_{i}|}$ to the highest one, i.e., $f_{i}^{0}(x)=0$ and
$f_{i}^{|F_{\mathrm{i}}}|(x)=1$ for all $x\in P_{i}$ . Suppose that $f’=(f_{1}^{0}, \ldots , f_{n}^{0})$ and $f^{\prime/}=(f_{1}^{|F_{1}|}, \ldots, f^{||}n)F_{\mathcal{R}}$ .
Introduce a non-negative payoff vector $\beta=\{\beta i\iota\}i\in N,l=0,\ldots,|F_{i}|$ , where component $\beta_{i\downarrow}$ expresses
a numerical estimation of enforce of player $i$ for changing cooperative function $f_{i}^{l-1}$ to $f_{i}^{l}$ .
The payoff vector $\beta$ is an imputation of $G(x_{0})$ if
$\beta_{i0=}h_{i}(_{X_{j’})},$ $i\in N$ , (4.2)
and
$\sum_{i\in N}\sum_{l=1}^{1}\beta_{il}=H(p_{t}|f’/)$ . (4.3)
Denote the set of imputations by $I(X_{0})$ . The set





is called the core of $G(x_{0})$ .
We shall say that $H$ is an admissible payoff function if $H(f’)= \min_{f\in F}H(f)$ . Now
we determine a sufficient condition for existence of the non-empty core in $G(x_{0})$ with the
admissible payoff function.
Introduce the sets $M_{i}=\{0,1, \ldots , |F_{i}|\},$ $i\in N$ . Since $H$ is admissible, the grant coalition
always can obtain the payoff $H(f’)$ . Thus, we should distribute just the difference $H(f^{\prime/})-$
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$H(f’)$ . Define the function $w(f)=H(f)-H(f’)$ , $f\in F$ . Let $M= \prod_{i\in N}M_{i}$ and
$m=(|F_{1}|\ldots, |F_{n}|)$ . Let us put one-to-one correspondence between $F$ and $M$ . We say that
$f=(f_{1}^{s_{1}}, \ldots, f_{n^{n}}s)\in F$ is related to $s=(s_{1}, ., . , s_{n})\in M$ . Consider a function $u:Marrow R_{+}^{1}$
satisfying $u(s)=w(f)$ if $f$ is related to $s$ . If $u(s)$ is additive or superadditive, we have a
multichoice game given by triple $(N, m, u)$ , where $N$ is the set of players, $m$ is the vector
describing the number of activity levels for every player, and $u$ is the characteristic function;
see $[1]-[3]$ . Denote the core of $(N, m, u)$ by
$C(u)=\{\xi=\{\xi il\}i\in N,l=0,\ldots,|Fi|\}$ , (4.5)
where $\xi_{i0}=0,$ $i\in N$ ,
$\sum_{i\in N}\sum_{l=0}^{i}\xi il=u(m|F|)$ , (4.6)
and for all $s\in M\backslash \{m\}$
$\sum_{i\in N}\sum_{l=0}\xi ilsi\geq u(s)$ . (4.7)
Theorem. Suppose that $G(x_{0})$ has the admissible payoff function. Then $C(x_{0})\neq\emptyset$ if
and only if there exists $(N, m, u)$ and $C(u)\neq\emptyset$ .
Proof. Let $C(X_{0})\neq\emptyset$ . Define $u(s)$ as follows:
$u(s)= \sum_{si:i\neq 0\iota}\sum_{0=}^{l}\beta Sil$
$- \sum_{0i:s_{i}\neq}\beta i0$
, $s\in M.$ (4.8)
Then
$u(m)= \sum_{\in iN}\sum^{i}\beta il-\sum_{i\iota=0\in N}\beta i0=H(f//)-H(f’)=w(f^{\prime/})|F|$ , (4.9)
and $u(\mathrm{O}, \ldots, 0)=0$ . Since $u(s)$ is additive, $C(u)$ has unique imputation $\xi$ with components
$\xi_{i0}=0$ , and $\xi_{il}=\beta_{il}$ if $l\neq 0$ .
Conversely, suppose that $(N, m, u)$ exists and $C(u)\neq\emptyset$ . By the definition of $(N, m, u)$ ,
we have
$\sum_{i\in N}\sum_{=l0}\xi il\geq u(s)=w(f)=H(f)-H(f’)$ , (4.10)
where $f$ is related to $s$ , and $\xi\in C(u)$ . Let $\beta_{il}=\xi_{il}$ for $l\neq 0$ and $\beta_{i0}=h_{i}(f’)$ . Then
s
$H(f) \leq\sum_{i\in N}\sum_{l=0}\beta il$
(4.11)
Hence $C(x_{0})\neq 0$ .
To conclude the paper, we find the core $C(x\mathrm{o})$ of the partial cooperative game in Exam-
ple 1.
Example 3. We have that $M_{1}=\{0,1,2\},$ $M_{2}=\{0,1,2,3\}$ and $M_{2}=\{0,1,2,3\}$ . Let us
use the following order of the cooperative functions: $f_{1}^{1}(X_{2}2)=1,$ $f_{1}^{1}(X_{0})=0,$ $f_{1}^{2}(X_{22})=1$ ,
$f_{1}^{2}(x_{0})=1,$ $f_{2}^{1}(x_{23})=1,$ $f_{2}^{1}(x_{11})=0,$ $f_{2}^{2}(x_{23})=0,$ $f_{2}^{2}(x_{11})=1,$ $f_{2}^{3}(x_{23})=1,$ $f_{2}^{3}(x_{11})=1$ ,
$f_{3}^{1}(X_{21})=1,$ $f_{3}^{1}(X_{12})=0,$ $f_{3}^{2}(X21)=0,$ $f_{3}^{2}(X_{12})=1,$ $f_{3}^{3}(X_{21})=1,$ $f_{3}^{3}(X_{12})=1$ . The related
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multichoice game $(N, m, u)$ can be constructed and by some calculations, we have that $C(u)$
consists of the imputations
$\xi=$ , (4.12)
such that $\xi_{11}+\xi_{12}\geq 1,$ $\xi_{31}+\xi_{32}\geq 1,$ $\xi_{11}+\xi_{31}\geq 1\frac{3}{4}$ and $\xi_{11}+\xi_{12}+\xi_{31}+\xi_{32}=8$ . By the
previous theorem we can see that for each $\xi\in C(u)$ the imputation
(4.13)
belongs to $C(x_{0})$ . Notice that all components of player 2 are zero. We explain it as follows.
In our example, the realization of the path $\{X_{0}, x_{12}, X23, x35\}$ leading to the maximal payoff
of the grand coalition $N$ depends on cooperative enforce of players 1 and 3 yet. When
player 2 doesn’t cooperate, on the node $x_{23}$ he chooses the left branch. Therefore, to reach
the endpoint $x_{35}$ the grand coalition doesn’t need in additional activity of player 2. In other
words, the cooperative activity of player 2 is dummy one. Thus, the willingness of player 2
to cooperation on the decision points $x_{11}$ and $x_{23}$ is estimated by zero.
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